USAID is being dismantled, what comes next? An Interview with Liz Grossman Kitoyi

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‘Most young Africans I meet are not mourning the loss of aid, but they’re questioning why it took so long to reckon with its fragility’

In this wide-ranging conversation, Dr Amber Murrey, a scholar of anti-imperial geographies and co-author of Learning Disobedience: Decolonizing Development Studies, speaks with Elizabeth (Liz) Grossman Kitoyi, founder of Baobab Consulting and a development practitioner with two decades of experience in Senegal, Malawi, New York, Washington DC, and elsewhere.

In this conversation, they explore the historical dismantling of USAID as a political and narrative project with profound implications for how Africa is positioned within US policy. This political project ultimately led to the dissolution of Liz’s own work with USAID. Drawing on Murrey’s longstanding critiques of the epistemic hierarchies embedded in the development industry, the discussion surfaces the structural dependencies hardwired into donor-driven systems and the contractor ecosystems that delimit the very meaning of ‘reform’. Yet, as Grossman Kitoyi reflects, there are also central spaces of African agency where young people, educators, and innovators are envisioning futures no longer tethered to aid’s fragile architectures. What unfolds is a shared call for narrative sovereignty, radical humility, and forms of development rooted in solidarity.

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Trump is attracting investment to the US – but at a huge cost to workers and the environment

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Early in his second presidency, Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs was met with widespread scepticism. Critics warned of economic decline and a global backlash. Yet the current landscape for the United States paints a more complex picture.

Less than a year into his second term in office, the White House claims that Trump is bringing manufacturing back to the US. It also proclaims that Trump has secured trillions of dollars of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2025 alone. Other voices, however, estimate that these commitments will amount to just a fraction of that.

So what’s the true picture? Much of this FDI is going into the US’s burgeoning semiconductor sector. This inward investment is indeed a stark reversal from the post-1991 trend of outbound American capital, when US firms raced to set up factories in countries where it was cheaper to manufacture.

And the surge is bolstered by commitments of US$300 billion (£225 billion) in capital investment commitments from tech giants like Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet and Meta. These investments reflect both Trump’s aggressive diplomacy and his close relationship with Silicon Valley’s tech elite.

Despite concerns about a tech bubble, these investments signal a deepening state-private partnership, and a reorientation of priorities with a view to coming out on top in the global AI race.

Central to this strategy is the reshaping of global supply chains. At a conference of venture capitalists in March, US vice-president J.D. Vance criticised US firms for their reliance on cheap overseas labour. He warned of the risks of losing the US’s technological advantage, especially to China.

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Geopolitics isn’t killing global supply chains—it’s powering them

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Global supply chains (GSCs) – which account for around 70 percent of international trade – are often referred to as the backbone of the world economy. As tensions rise between major powers—especially the United States and China – many commentators fear for the future of GSC’s and hence the world economy. Such projections overlook how geopolitical rivalries have stimulated the development of advanced technologies, which in turn enabled the rise and ongoing transformation of global supply chains.

A close look at the US-led development of technology during the Cold War shows that it enabled the formation and expansion of many contemporary global supply chains. China in turn has made efforts to catch-up to US technological development, and in response, the US has been deploying strategies to curb China’s tech rise amid a new geopolitical rivalry.

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The Data War Comes Home

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The Trump administration’s ongoing attempts at manipulating US government economic data echoes controversies that have existed in the realm of development data for decades. These controversies highlight the unavoidable, intrinsically political nature of measuring social phenomena with economic statistics, and the role of economists in legitimizing (or not) such measures.

In early August, the employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) showed weaker than expected job growth for July and announced downward revisions (fewer new jobs than previously reported) for the two months prior. Trump responded by calling the accuracy of the report into question, and firing the head of the BLS, a career civil servant. This move provoked a round of criticism from other civil servants, economists, and experts on democracy, which only intensified when Trump initially nominated as the replacement E.J. Antoni, the chief economist for the right-wing think tank The Heritage Foundation. Antoni had been an outspoken critic of the BLS reports, even suggesting the possibility of ceasing to release monthly jobs data altogether, and was widely perceived by critics as both highly partisan and underqualified for the position. There is widespread concern that the jobs report will become less reliable, even leading to the current staff at the BLS publicly pleading with the public to still trust their numbers, for now. The BLS is also responsible for producing the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the central measure of inflation produced by the US government. Inflation’s centrality in recent politics, including promises from Trump to bring down prices on “day one,” have led to concerns that this measure could also be affected by political manipulation. There would be important real-world and policy impacts of a degraded CPI measure,  which affects tax brackets, the value of some treasury bonds, and social security and other social insurance payments.

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Lula da Silva and Brazilian financialization: Learning from Dilma and the Limits of Confronting Finance

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The year 2025 will be the third consecutive year in which the Brazilian economy experiences sustained growth. During the first two years of his administration, economic expansion was above 3% annually, while the outlook for 2025 is for a slowdown: 2.4%, according to IPEA, one of Brazil’s leading state economic analysis agencies.

Since June-July 2024, during the U.S. presidential election and with the possibility of Trump being re-elected, Brazil, like other emerging economies, faced devaluation pressures. This led to higher inflation due to rising exchange rates and supply shocks caused by climate issues. These issues have reduced the food supply (mainly coffee, eggs, and beans), causing prices to rise.

This macroeconomic instability scenario was reloaded by the Trump-driven trade war, particularly when the 50% tariff on purchases from Brazil was announced under a mix of arguments between commercial (trade deficit), political (preventing Bolsonaro from being judged for an attempted coup d’état and US bigtech’s regulation), and geopolitical (the advance of the BRICS on a possible replacement of the dollar in commercial relationships).

What was the response in terms of economic policy? The institutionalization of the inflation target led to an increase in the SELIC interest rate from 10.75% in September 2024 to 15% in June 2025, the highest level since 2006. The orthodox argument suggests that raising interest rates reduces the money supply, curbing aggregate demand and reducing inflation. From another perspective, raising interest rates promotes carry trade, which attracts foreign capital through the capital account and allows the exchange rate to appreciate. In this way, the economy partially protects itself from speculative capital outflows and reduces the prices of imports and exports, thus decreasing the inflation.

In contrast, a sharp rise in interest rates deepens the pernicious effects of financialization: it impoverishes indebted families and concentrates income. Are there any other alternatives available? The economic toolbox offers other options. Many observers have noted a striking characteristic of Lula’s third administration: the absence of open confrontation with Brazil’s powerful financial sector. This is no coincidence. The painful lessons of Dilma Rousseff’s presidency (2011-2016) and her impeachment weigh heavily on current political calculations.

To understand this, we need to analyze the historical lesson of Rousseff’s removal, its macroeconomic causes, and how this experience has limited economic policy options.

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The Fiscal Black Holes of Mainstream Economics

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By Jacob Assa and Marc Morgan

“The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being deceived by economists.”
― Joan Robinson

Recent years have seen a proliferation of debates on the shrinking of fiscal space in both industrialized and developing countries. In the former, the discussion often takes the form of agonizing over fiscal ‘black holes’, whereas in the latter it is usually presented in the context of ‘unaffordable debt’.

In reality, the real black holes, or blind spots, are those found in neoclassical economic models underlying such debates, rather than in the real economy (Table 1). We describe three such neoclassical fiscal black holes, based on our recent paper ‘The General Relativity of Fiscal Space’.

Table 1. Overview of fiscal black holes in the neoclassical paradigm.

Source: Authors’ elaboration. Shaded in black are the black holes of the neoclassical fiscal paradigm.

We show how fiscal space is not the absolute sum of taxes and borrowing, but rather relative in several ways. It depends on macroeconomic conditions, such as unemployment and inflation, countries’ degree of monetary sovereignty, and their level of productive capacity. Furthermore, fiscal space is relative to what governments do with it, expanding or contracting depending on the function of public spending.

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Jorge Lobo Miglioli (1935-2025): Marx, Kalecki and the desenvolvimentistas dream in Brazil

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I met Professor Jorge Miglioli in 2000, the year I started my undergraduate studies in Economics at UNESP, Araraquara – Brazil, fully convinced it was the right path if you wanted to change the world. I did briefly consider Sociology too, but my mum (like any another mum who dreams of their children doing better than they did) put her foot down: I didn’t work this hard to give you a good education just so you could become a schoolteacher! That settled it.

Just a little over a month into the course, I found myself in the middle of one of the longest national university strikes in Brazil. For context: Brazilian universities are publicly funded by both national and state governments, and higher education is tuition-free. That strike, so early in my academic journey, made me question whether I had chosen the right course. Most of my peers simply returned to their hometowns instead of staying and engaging with what was happening. It wouldn’t be fair to say they were against the strike; they just didn’t care. Many of them came from the Brazilian middle class or up, which reflects the schizophrenia of our tuition-free higher education system. They were on a clear path to join the elite, working in banks, big corporations, and so on, and the strike had simply disrupted that trajectory. They just wanted to get back to their normal lives. Things were even worse in my department, the Department of Economics, where only two, maybe three professors supported the strike. The majority made it clear they were against it and disappeared for the entire duration, which lasted nearly four months

On the bright side, that moment introduced me to fellow Economics students who stayed, supported the strike, and opened the door to an economics that actually mattered – they would also become dear friends. It was through them that I first encountered Karl Marx. I also met Renata Belzunces, the student leading the strike in my campus, admired by many, including Professor Jorge Miglioli, and who went to become one of the most inspiring role models I’ve ever had.[1] And it was in this moment that I met Professor Jorge Miglioli too.

Miglioli, who eventually became “Miglis” to me, a nickname he never fully liked but accepted nonetheless (I’m not sure I ever gave him much choice!), was different. There were no ‘buts’ with Miglioli when it came to the strike. I remember him saying something like How else do you expect capitalists and the government to hear us? But it wasn’t just what he said, it was how he said it. There was no attempt to convince, no rhetorical flourish. It was more like: why are we even debating this? His tone carried a kind of quiet certainty, and beneath it, a deep frustration and disillusionment with the fact that this even needed to be explained.

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New World Order against Tariffs: SCO Development Bank as an anti-sanctions tool?

Farwa Sial1 Comment

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO’s) 2025 summit in Tianjin produced a series of outcomes that, although modest in appearance, are strategically significant. The most prominent developments were the agreement in principle to establish an SCO Development Bank, seeded with approximately ¥2 billion in grants and a further ¥10–14 billion in concessional loans from China. The summit also saw Beijing extend access to its BeiDou satellite navigation system to member states, enhancing both civilian and defence applications from aviation and port logistics to military procurement. On the security side, leaders condemned the Pahalgam attack in India, a diplomatic win for India that underscores China’s effort to align with India at a moment when the U.S. has imposed tariffs of up to 50% on Indian exports, citing India’s purchases of Russian oil. These headline measures were complemented by renewed emphasis on counter-terrorism through RATS (the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure) and a set of intensified SCO security-council meetings, together signalling a broadening of the organisation’s remit from finance into hard security enablers.

An additional dimension, often overlooked, is the SCO’s latent potential to serve as a platform for India–Pakistan rapprochement. Much as Beijing successfully mediated the Iran–Saudi détente in 2023, the SCO framework offers a structured environment in which India and Pakistan are compelled to engage on shared issues such as counter-terrorism, energy connectivity, and infrastructure finance, under the auspices of a formal multilateralism rather than crude bilateral confrontation. The Tianjin summit’s emphasis on regional security cooperation, and its explicit condemnation of the Pahalgam attack, is already a small step in this direction, reflecting a willingness to acknowledge Indian concerns in a joint forum. With signs that India-China relations have modestly stabilised following high-level military disengagement talks along the LAC, there is space for Beijing to use the SCO to nudge India and Pakistan toward functional cooperation. This is not purely hypothetical: emergent trilateral conversations between India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh around trade corridors and energy-grid integration suggest that South Asia’s major economies are beginning to see value in pragmatic coordination despite unresolved disputes. In this sense, the SCO could provide an institutional ecosystem for gradual confidence-building between New Delhi and Islamabad, where shared participation in multilateral projects lowers the political cost of engagement, much as regional institutions elsewhere have historically diluted bilateral rivalries.

In line with a broader shift in global governance, recent commentary by Xinhua portrays the SCO as emblematic of Eurasian agency and multipolar resonance; “a living expression of multipolarity,” bringing together diverse actors under a shared framework of non‑interference, counter‑terrorism, and connectivity. The enrolment of rivals within a single institutional ecosystem, makes the SCO, less of a confrontational bloc and closer to a practical architecture for regional autonomy and development.

Literature on the international financial architecture, has often highlighted the tension between established Western institutions and the alternative arrangements that have grown around them with much of the scholarship focusing on institutional challenges such as the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the New Development Bank (NDB). Yet the more subtle processes of institutional layering, where new mechanisms grow alongside existing ones, gradually altering the balance of power have received far less attention.

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