Dead souls in the sugarlands: Counterinsurgency and the moral life of solidarity in Negros

In Nikolai Gogol’s Dead Souls, the peasant appears twice dead. First in life, as property; then in death, as inventory lingering in the bureaucratic ledgers of the empire. Pavel Chichikov, Gogol’s wandering con man, traverses provincial Russia purchasing the names of deceased serfs still counted in the census so he can accumulate fictive wealth from human absence. The grotesque brilliance of the novel lies not merely in the absurdity of the scheme, but in Gogol’s revelation that serfdom corrupts everyone. The peasant suffers most brutally, but landlords, bureaucrats, merchants, and respectable society itself become spiritually deformed by a social order that converts human beings into abstraction. Gogol was not a revolutionary prophet. Yet history would eventually sweep away the old landed order through the Russian Revolution of 1917, as if the moral rot he diagnosed had become historically unbearable.

I carried Gogol with me to Negros.

Not literally, of course. One does not bring Russian novels to fact-finding missions in a countryside thick with military checkpoints, grief, and the scorching heat that clings to the sugar fields. But Dead Souls returned to me in Toboso as we listened to the initial accounts surrounding the massacre of the Negros 19. Their names had already begun entering the cold grammar of state security discourse even before families could fully mourn them. “Encounter.” “Armed rebels.” “Recovered firearms.” The dead transformed almost instantly into administrative objects, into a narrative assembled in advance by counterinsurgency.

But the farmers and residents knew the dead otherwise. They knew who laughed most easily, who planted monggo beans, who worried over school expenses, who hummed songs while walking, who sang softly while planting, who fetched water before dawn. They remembered those whom the fact-finding mission confirmed as civilians—Alyssa Alano, Errol Wendel, Maureen Santuyo, RJ Ledesma, Kai Sorem, and Lyle Prijoles—not as names suspended in the cold grammar of casualty reports, but as lives once woven into the ordinary intimacies of community, into fields, unfinished conversations, and futures interrupted. While the state speaks in categories, the masses remember persons.

The grammar of counterinsurgency

This is the peculiar violence of counterinsurgency in the Philippines. One is stripped first of political humanity before one is stripped of life itself. The communist and the criminal, the organizer and the addict, the activist and the terrorist collapse into a single disposable category. Dehumanization prepares the conditions for killing while simultaneously anesthetizing the public imagination against outrage. Language itself becomes corrupted. The horrific casualness of terms like “corned beef” to refer to mangled bodies reveals not only cruelty but habituation to cruelty. A society learns to joke in the dialect of counterinsurgency.

Gogol understood this. The dead soul is not only the dead peasant. It is also the living conscience that gradually loses its capacity to recognize another human being.

Negros has long been treated as the dark unconscious of the Philippine social order. The island of sugar and massacres: Escalante, Sagay, the Fausto family of Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Guihulngan, and Toboso. They recur not because history repeats itself mechanically but because the agrarian question remains unresolved. Landlessness persists beside concentrated wealth. Hunger persists beside export agriculture. And whenever peasants attempt to organize themselves into a historical force capable of confronting this arrangement, they encounter not merely landlords but the full architecture of counterinsurgency.

Closure of peace

The tragedy deepened after the Duterte government unilaterally scuttled the peace talks with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines in 2017. The peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines had opened difficult but meaningful possibilities. No one serious about social transformation romanticizes negotiations. They are contradictory, frustrating, and difficult. Yet peace talks offered something rare in Philippine political life: an acknowledgment that the roots of armed conflict were social and historical, not merely criminal.

One historical possibility was foreclosed and another violently consolidated. In place of negotiations came the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict, the reinforcement of the so-called whole-of-nation approach, Executive Order No. 32, intensified militarization, Operation Sauron, and an atmosphere in which legal democratic dissent itself became suspect. Once more, counterinsurgency is presented as the state’s preferred alternative to peace talks. And its casualties spread outward: peasants, labor organizers, activists, development workers, teachers, lawyers, indigenous leaders, revolutionaries, families. The countryside felt this immediately.

It is impossible for me to think about this history abstractly.

Kerima Tariman comes to me whenever I return to Negros. Her laughter arrives first, before memory catches up with death. She too was killed on the island, under the same machinery of anti-communist violence that continues to haunt Negros with terrible consistency. The same 79th Infantry Battalion implicated in the killing of the Negros 19 was also involved in the death of a revolutionary whose friendship carried the warmth and ferocity reserved for those who understand commitment not merely as ideology, but as companionship forged under pressure. Soon after came Ericson Acosta, whose remains we retrieved after his killing by the military in Kabankalan. The retrieval of a friend’s body alters something fundamental in one’s relationship to history. Politics ceases to be an argument about abstractions. One carries death physically: through mud and rain, exhaustion and paperwork, signatures and waiting, and finally through the unbearable intimacy of identification.

Yet the dead do not disappear. This is perhaps what frightened ruling classes historically about communists, peasant movements, and national liberation struggles. The dead continue organizing the living. Memory itself becomes insurgent.

Acceptable limits of dissent

The ruling order understands this well, which is why anti-communism does not move only through bullets. It travels through discourse, institutions, funding structures, and the respectable language of “democratic management”. Violence in the countryside is often accompanied by another labor elsewhere: the narrowing of political imagination.

The NGO world frequently emerges here as a contradictory terrain. Many inside it are sincere, exhausted, and deeply committed to the poor; some are dear friends. Yet structures possess their own gravity. What begins as solidarity may gradually become administration. Political struggle becomes project-based, measured in donor cycles, policy outputs, stakeholder consultations, and carefully calibrated forms of dissent. Revolution becomes too impolite a word. Liberation yields to resilience; structural transformation to capacity-building; imperialism to governance deficits.

None of this renders reform meaningless. Reforms matter because suffering is immediate. But there are moments in Negros when one senses the limits of managerial compassion. One cannot sit with peasants shaped by generations of landlessness, listen to mothers narrate massacre, watch children learn the ordinary disciplines of fear, and still believe history may be resolved through technical adjustment alone. The countryside strips language of comfort. It asks harder questions. Not whether reform matters, but whether reform becomes the horizon beyond which justice itself is no longer permitted to travel.

Counterinsurgency by military means seeks to eliminate revolutionary movements physically. Counterinsurgency by reformist means seeks to discipline the very horizon of emancipation—teaching society to fear revolution more than the conditions that produce it.

The living refusal

Gogol’s Chichikov accumulated wealth through dead peasants listed in imperial ledgers. Our contemporary order does not trade in dead serfs, yet there are moments in Negros when one feels surrounded by another species of dead souls: farmers rendered socially disposable by landlessness and militarization; activists transformed into targets through red-tagging; ordinary citizens taught to fear organizers more than structural injustice; intellectuals who, from above, speak endlessly of democracy while remaining silent about class war.

But there is another side to Negros that state discourse cannot fully comprehend.

During the mission, amid testimonies and mourning, people received us warmly and trusted us with their stories—their struggles both mundane and tragic, the painstaking calculations of survival, the ways they coax plants to live through unforgiving conditions and make sure children remain safe long before they can be vaccinated. We listened to accounts of loss and endurance, of interrupted harvests and unfinished conversations, of lives lived under the shadow of militarization yet never fully surrendered to it.

The living struggle of farmers in the Philippines persists precisely because peasants are not dead souls. They continue planting, grieving, organizing, loving, and risking despite conditions designed to exhaust historical hope.

This is why the peasantry remains dangerous.

Not because peasants are inherently violent, as anti-communist fantasy imagines, but because their collective existence continually exposes the unfinished business of Philippine history. The agrarian question remains like a wound the nation refuses to treat except through militarization. Every massacre becomes both revelation and warning: revelation of structural violence, warning against resistance.

And still resistance continues.

When the dead refuse disappearance

Solidarity begins where the ruling order fails to dictate the terms of human worth. It is the refusal to surrender to an arrangement of power that decides whose life matters, whose death counts, whose grief deserves language, and whose suffering must disappear into statistics, suspicion, or silence. In places such as Toboso, remembrance itself becomes an act of political fidelity.

This was evident in the life and death of Roger Fabillar, known to many simply as Jhong, a man in his late-thirties remembered not first through the abstractions of conflict, but through the intimacies of everyday life. In Toboso, he was beloved as a childhood playmate, a familiar presence in the ordinary geography of the barrio. People sought his counsel: how to process documents for land claims, how to confront everyday grievances with restraint, patience, and collective resolve. He inhabited that narrow and demanding space where political commitment and everyday care become indistinguishable.

When Ka Roger died, hundreds of Toboso residents rode their motorcycles beneath the torrid sun to accompany him in death as they had trusted him in life. They came despite the atmosphere of fear, despite surveillance, despite the risks that often shadow public mourning in militarized communities. Dust gathered on their clothes, heat pressed against their skin, but attendance itself became testimony. To pay tribute was to insist that memory belongs  to those who endure and not to those who govern by force.

A mother who had lost her son once put it this way, without theatricality nor bitterness: Here, there are two laws—the law of the army and the law of the digbay (digmang bayan)—the people’s war. Ka Roger, to many among the poorest who struggle and fight, belonged to the latter moral world: not terrorism as named by the state, but an undertaking of the oppressed toward liberation, a difficult and dangerous labor endowed with dignity. Leadership in such a struggle was not privilege but burden, and yet a prestigious one—earned through trust, sacrifice, and steadfastness. Perhaps this is why his funeral drew so many: because for those who came, mourning Ka Roger was inseparable from honoring what he had represented—a promise, however tenuous, that justice may yet belong to those history has most often abandoned.

Perhaps this is where Gogol finally becomes insufficient for us. His satire diagnosed decay brilliantly, but he could not fully imagine the revolutionary energies gathering beneath the old order. The Philippine countryside today likewise contains forces larger than the narratives imposed upon it by counterinsurgency. Beneath the discourse of national security lies a simpler and more enduring conflict: those who labor for the land and those who monopolize it; those who dream of liberation and those who mistake order for peace. 

In Negros, the dead remain close to the living. But unlike Gogol’s dead souls trapped in bureaucratic limbo, our dead insist on movement. They accompany fact-finding missions, wake us in the middle of the night, return in songs and stories, and demand from the living not pity but historical courage. Something spectral still moves through the countryside —not fear alone, nor merely grief, but unfinished history itself, returning insistently through every massacre, every harvest, every struggle that refuses disappearance.

The question is whether Philippine society still possesses enough moral life to hear them.

Sarah Raymundo serves on the National Executive Board of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) and as President of the Philippines-Bolivarian Venezuela Friendship Association. 

This post was first published on the Philippines-based platform Bulatlat.

The current Western Angst and a case for Development Studies 2.0   


In September 2025, Adam Tooze sent a shock wave through Development studies circles (in the West) with an essay entitled “The End of Development”. He declared the evident truth that “the West’s aid model was always a mirage” and that “the UN Sustainable Development Goals now look less like a new dawn than the final gasp of a unipolar, end-of-history fantasy”. Yet, so-called ‘development’ speaks to more than aid and Western dominance. This blog post argues that what might be the end of aid could be the beginning of understanding and studying development as an endogenous process within international constraints and opportunities. For this to happen, we, as development scholars, need to resist falling back into narrow conceptions of ‘Development’ as either aid-based or big power rivalry and overcome anxious paralysis and self-pity over the end of uncontested US hegemony. Instead, we need to use the current moment as an opportunity to rethink and finally effectively conceptualise how national politics and global economic structures condition each other.

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Industrial Policy between Rentierisation and Retaliation

Industrial policy, once a taboo in mainstream economics, is being mainstreamed by the very institutions that spent four decades stigmatising it. In March 2026, the World Bank published Industrial Policy for Development: Approaches in the 21st Century, co-authored by Ana Margarida Fernandes and Tristan Reed. The IMF, has done a similar volte face, first in its 2019 working paper ‘The Return of the Policy That Shall Not Be Named’ and again in the October 2025 World Economic Outlook, which has a chapter titled ‘Industrial Policy: Managing Trade-Offs to Promote Growth and Resilience’. That the IMF and World Bank have now openly readmitted industrial policy into their vocabulary is no small thing. Does it mean the tide has turned on austerity and market fundamentalism?

The argument of this article is that this rhetorical turn arrives bound by two structural constraints that the new Bretton Woods literature largely refuses to confront: the ongoing rentierisation of Global South economies through IMF-World Bank conditionality, and the imperial retaliation that meets serious attempts at sovereign industrialisation. Industrial policy on the terms set by Washington and Wall Street will not free up the policy space the Global South needs; it risks becoming another financial product or technocratic buzzword layered onto an already extractive architecture.

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Stabilising wages, fragmenting workers: what comes after Indonesia’s wage ruling?

What actually constitutes the key agenda for workers in Indonesia beyond celebrating May Day as a symbol of struggle? Wages in Indonesia are never truly “negotiated”; they are determined, stabilized, and at the same time separated from the political power that should be able to challenge them. Since the authoritarian New Order regime, the state has built a corporatist framework that not only suppresses independent worker organizations but also fragments the possibility of forming an effective collective force. Reformasi did open space for freedom of association, yet instead of producing consolidation, what emerged was fragmentation—many unions, but weak and divided. Thus, when integrated into global value chains, this configuration finds its function: the state no longer needs to repress workers overtly; it suffices to stabilize wages through mechanisms that appear technocratic, while allowing fragmentation to persist. In this way, low wages in Indonesia are not a failure, but rather the result of a strategy historically shaped and continuously reproduced—a form of partial class accommodation, uneven, and spatially conditioned.

Control over workers today no longer operates primarily through open repression, but through the way wages are calculated and normalized as a technical matter. Wage-setting formulas that link minimum wage increases to inflation and economic growth are presented as rational policies to maintain balance between worker and business. Yet this is precisely where the politics operates: wage conflict is removed from the arena of collective bargaining and locked into calculations that from the outset limit bargaining space. This shift becomes clear when compared to the mechanism based on Decent Living Needs (KHL), which—although not entirely free from depoliticization—still opened space for surveys and the articulation of demands, particularly in industrial areas with high concentrations of workers. Because it was seen as disrupting worker cost stabilization, this space was later closed through formulas that standardize increases while simultaneously dampening conflict. Concessions to workers are not entirely eliminated, but emerge as the result of struggles that under certain conditions succeed in forcing the state and capital to grant space, as in the case of THR and the expansion of social security through BPJS. However, these achievements do not alter the fundamental structure of wages, which remains low and fragmented; rather, they appear as limited and segmented compromises. Thus, what is produced is not merely wage stabilization, but also the management of workers’ power itself: on the one hand, there are forms of protection that are concentrated and appear progressive, while on the other, the underlying structure continues to maintain spatial differentiation and the collective weakness of worker. In this condition, class compromise does not occur comprehensively, but is produced partially, unevenly, and remains locked within a low-wage regime.

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Green Debt Bondage: How Indonesia’s Electric Transition Deepens Platform Driver Exploitation

Somewhere in the state of Maharashtra, a cotton farmer took his own life after years of compounding debt and crop failure. Across India, this tragedy is not rare. The National Crime Records Bureau recorded 11,290 farmer and farm-labourer suicides in 2022—roughly one death every hour—with debt consistently identified as a leading cause (Down to Earth, 2023). In Sulawesi, Indonesia, villages are being cleared to make way for nickel smelters that supply the batteries of the global electric-vehicle boom. Workers at the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park earn higher wages than they would in farming, but face fatal furnace explosions and respiratory damage as recurring occupational risks (Campbell & Lee, 2024; Global Witness, 2025). And on the streets of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya, a new population of electric motorcycle drivers pedal their way through twelve-, fourteen-, sixteen-hour days (Novianto, 2025a), servicing loans they never chose and rental fees that can never be fully paid.

These are not three unrelated stories. They are distinct moments in a single global process: the uneven, extractive, and deeply political reorganisation of labour under the banner of the green transition. In this article, I want to argue, drawing on my fieldwork with electric-vehicle (EV) platform drivers in Indonesia, that this reorganisation has produced what I call a regime of green debt bondage—a configuration in which ecological transition, platform governance, and financialised credit converge to bind workers to perpetual labour without delivering the promised climate dividend.

Debt bondage is most often associated with pre-capitalist or early-capitalist forms of coercion: the indentured plantation worker, the brick-kiln labourer, the trafficked domestic servant (Breman, 2007; Brass, 2011; LeBaron, 2014). Its reappearance inside the shiny, algorithmic, climate-friendly infrastructure of platform capitalism should unsettle us. It signals not a rupture from coercive labour regimes, but their transformation into more diffuse and systemically embedded forms. What I call green debt bondage refers to a condition in which workers are not only tied through credit, rental schemes, and platform deductions, but are also structurally compelled to remain within precarious work due to the absence of viable, decent employment alternatives.

In this regime, indebtedness does not operate in isolation; it interacts with broader labour market constraints that limit workers’ capacity to exit. Debt becomes a mechanism that deepens this entrapment—pushing drivers to work longer hours, accept worsening conditions, and absorb greater risks simply to service obligations they cannot easily escape. As such, the “greening” of transport in Southeast Asia does not merely reorganise infrastructure, but reconfigures coercion itself: embedding exploitation within both financial relations and structural labour precarity under the banner of ecological transition.

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Militarised AI, Private Credit, and Iran War

By Farwa Sial and C.P. Chandrasekhar 

Private credit markets are showing real signs of stress, with multiple major funds restricting withdrawals as investors struggle to exit illiquid holdings. The fears of investors in these funds, which explain the withdrawals, is driven by the success of AI, which, while driven by enormous capital spending financed in part by private credit, is perceived as disrupting the pre-existing software landscape, many of the creators of which had been financed with credit from these funds. These two dynamics are increasingly tied to military demand, with the US government encouraging private capital to build defence-linked AI infrastructure. The war on Iran is amplifying these trends by squeezing energy costs, tightening liquidity, and accelerating a shift wherein AI investment becomes less market-driven and more concentrated around state-backed priorities.

Around the 22 March 2026, two of the largest players in private credit, Apollo Global Management and Ares Management, dropped redemption gates on flagship retail credit vehicles, temporarily limiting and/or restricting investors from withdrawing their money. While investors had requested withdrawals of 11.2% and 11.6% respectively, both funds capped redemptions at 5%, leaving roughly half of requested capital locked in place.

The gating at Apollo and Ares is just one visible manifestation of broader strains across the roughly $1.8 trillion private credit market. On April 2, it was reported that Blue Owl capital had received redemption requests of upto $5.4 billion over the first quarter of 2026, with those requests amounting to 22% of its private credit fund and a much higher 41% of another of its funds target at software and technology firms. In response, Blue Owl announced a cap on redemptions of 5% of shareholder funds. Earlier BlackRock restricted withdrawals on its HPS Lending Fund, which stands at approximately $26 billion. Blackstone faced roughly $3.8 billion in redemption requests from its flagship private credit fund and stepped in with its own capital to help meet those withdrawals. Morgan Stanley saw around 11% repurchase requests in its North Haven Private Income Fund and Cliffwater honoured only about 7% of roughly 14% redemption requests.  

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The ‘Academic Apex’ and the Colonisation of Development: Unmasking the RCT Scam

For the better part of two decades, development economics has been held captive by a ‘clinical’ revolution. What began as a niche statistical tool has, through a masterclass in institutional branding, been elevated to the undisputed ‘Gold Standard’ of economic science. We are told a heartwarming tale of ‘Nobel laureates caring about poverty’, a narrative where the ‘bottom billion’ are finally being saved by the rigorous, scientific tinkering of MIT and Harvard.

But as I argue in the newly released second edition of Nobel Laureates Caring About Poverty: Banerjee, Duflo, MIT, and Randomized Controlled Trials(2026), if we strip away the public relations sheen, a far more cynical reality emerges. This is not a story of scientific discovery but an ‘Inside Job’ executed with clinical precision. It is a rebranding exercise designed to cement institutional power and create a circular monopoly over global funding and academic prestige.

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An anti-imperialist just transition: From fossil fuel treaty to the shaky nuclear non-proliferation treaty

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif (third from left) at the Board of Peace’s charter announcement and signing ceremony during the World Economic Forum in January 2026 in Switzerland. Photo: Daniel Torok / White House

The recent withdrawal of the US from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and other international organizations in January 2026, was preceded by the decision in COP30 Belém to have rights-based and people-centred approach to the Just Transition Mechanism in October 2025.

The US exit from the UNFCCC, the primary global treaty on climate will take full effect in a year’s time. The new attempt to define and revive a Just Transition mechanism, without US interference is considered hopeful, especially since it is linked to the Belém Action Mechanism” (BAM), an initiative which attempts to foster international cooperation, technical assistance, and capacity-building to ensure an orderly shift away from fossil fuels, and has been strongly supported by civil society and activists.

However, the new Just Transition Mechanism faces a fundamental problem: the historical conditions that made both its conception and implementation conceivable have now become obsolete. The UNFCCC bureaucracy has long operated on the pretence that imperialism does not exist, but it is now confronted with a reality in which neoliberalism has collapsed and US-led imperialism has re-emerged in an overtly militarised and increasingly fascistic form.

Neoliberalism no longer merely shortens life expectancy; it is now accelerating death rates globally through active war and warfare (see Kadri 2023). This shift is also reshaping the modalities of imperialism itself. US-led trade de-globalisation (through tariffs and EU protectionism) now coincides with a deepening of financial imperialism, marked by escalating sovereign debt crises, financial engineering, and the rapid expansion of private credit. As C.P Chandrasekhar notes, one of the likely scenario of this is that the world economy on the whole will not even have an escape route to ameliorate economic hardship and move towards a viable recovery.

In this context, the central question becomes what kind of “Just Transition” is even possible. More fundamentally, what would a genuinely people-centred Just Transition mean under these conditions?

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