An anti-imperialist just transition: From fossil fuel treaty to the shaky nuclear non-proliferation treaty

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif (third from left) at the Board of Peace’s charter announcement and signing ceremony during the World Economic Forum in January 2026 in Switzerland. Photo: Daniel Torok / White House

The recent withdrawal of the US from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and other international organizations in January 2026, was preceded by the decision in COP30 Belém to have rights-based and people-centred approach to the Just Transition Mechanism in October 2025.

The US exit from the UNFCCC, the primary global treaty on climate will take full effect in a year’s time. The new attempt to define and revive a Just Transition mechanism, without US interference is considered hopeful, especially since it is linked to the Belém Action Mechanism” (BAM), an initiative which attempts to foster international cooperation, technical assistance, and capacity-building to ensure an orderly shift away from fossil fuels, and has been strongly supported by civil society and activists.

However, the new Just Transition Mechanism faces a fundamental problem: the historical conditions that made both its conception and implementation conceivable have now become obsolete. The UNFCCC bureaucracy has long operated on the pretence that imperialism does not exist, but it is now confronted with a reality in which neoliberalism has collapsed and US-led imperialism has re-emerged in an overtly militarised and increasingly fascistic form.

Neoliberalism no longer merely shortens life expectancy; it is now accelerating death rates globally through active war and warfare (see Kadri 2023). This shift is also reshaping the modalities of imperialism itself. US-led trade de-globalisation (through tariffs and EU protectionism) now coincides with a deepening of financial imperialism, marked by escalating sovereign debt crises, financial engineering, and the rapid expansion of private credit. As C.P Chandrasekhar notes, one of the likely scenario of this is that the world economy on the whole will not even have an escape route to ameliorate economic hardship and move towards a viable recovery.

In this context, the central question becomes what kind of “Just Transition” is even possible. More fundamentally, what would a genuinely people-centred Just Transition mean under these conditions?

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ASEAN Summit 2025: Imperialism, Monetary Subservience, and Racial/Class Divisions

By Farwa Sial and Fadiah Nadwa Fikri

The 47th Summit of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), held in Malaysia in October 2025, was a pivotal moment in the ongoing attempts by the United States to redefine the socioeconomic trajectory of Southeast Asia. While much analysis of the Summit has focused on the impact of US tariffs, there has been less attention to how these deals constrict the region’s monetary autonomy. Here we focus on the stipulations in the deals that will impose monetary subservience in Malaysia and Thailand, under the framework of ASEAN. The signing of these agreements is not a purely exogenously drive, but rather aligns with ASEAN’s historical anticommunist foundations. By deepening the region’s subordination to the United States while simultaneously expanding trade relations with China, the deals also hold implications for reconfiguring racial and class dynamics in the region.

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USAID is being dismantled, what comes next? An Interview with Liz Grossman Kitoyi

Most young Africans I meet are not mourning the loss of aid, but they’re questioning why it took so long to reckon with its fragility’

In this wide-ranging conversation, Dr Amber Murrey, a scholar of anti-imperial geographies and co-author of Learning Disobedience: Decolonizing Development Studies, speaks with Elizabeth (Liz) Grossman Kitoyi, founder of Baobab Consulting and a development practitioner with two decades of experience in Senegal, Malawi, New York, Washington DC, and elsewhere.

In this conversation, they explore the historical dismantling of USAID as a political and narrative project with profound implications for how Africa is positioned within US policy. This political project ultimately led to the dissolution of Liz’s own work with USAID. Drawing on Murrey’s longstanding critiques of the epistemic hierarchies embedded in the development industry, the discussion surfaces the structural dependencies hardwired into donor-driven systems and the contractor ecosystems that delimit the very meaning of ‘reform’. Yet, as Grossman Kitoyi reflects, there are also central spaces of African agency where young people, educators, and innovators are envisioning futures no longer tethered to aid’s fragile architectures. What unfolds is a shared call for narrative sovereignty, radical humility, and forms of development rooted in solidarity.

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Trump is attracting investment to the US – but at a huge cost to workers and the environment

Early in his second presidency, Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs was met with widespread scepticism. Critics warned of economic decline and a global backlash. Yet the current landscape for the United States paints a more complex picture.

Less than a year into his second term in office, the White House claims that Trump is bringing manufacturing back to the US. It also proclaims that Trump has secured trillions of dollars of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2025 alone. Other voices, however, estimate that these commitments will amount to just a fraction of that.

So what’s the true picture? Much of this FDI is going into the US’s burgeoning semiconductor sector. This inward investment is indeed a stark reversal from the post-1991 trend of outbound American capital, when US firms raced to set up factories in countries where it was cheaper to manufacture.

And the surge is bolstered by commitments of US$300 billion (£225 billion) in capital investment commitments from tech giants like Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet and Meta. These investments reflect both Trump’s aggressive diplomacy and his close relationship with Silicon Valley’s tech elite.

Despite concerns about a tech bubble, these investments signal a deepening state-private partnership, and a reorientation of priorities with a view to coming out on top in the global AI race.

Central to this strategy is the reshaping of global supply chains. At a conference of venture capitalists in March, US vice-president J.D. Vance criticised US firms for their reliance on cheap overseas labour. He warned of the risks of losing the US’s technological advantage, especially to China.

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Geopolitics isn’t killing global supply chains—it’s powering them

Global supply chains (GSCs) – which account for around 70 percent of international trade – are often referred to as the backbone of the world economy. As tensions rise between major powers—especially the United States and China – many commentators fear for the future of GSC’s and hence the world economySuch projections overlook how geopolitical rivalries have stimulated the development of advanced technologies, which in turn enabled the rise and ongoing transformation of global supply chains.

A close look at the US-led development of technology during the Cold War shows that it enabled the formation and expansion of many contemporary global supply chains. China in turn has made efforts to catch-up to US technological development, and in response, the US has been deploying strategies to curb China’s tech rise amid a new geopolitical rivalry.

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The Data War Comes Home

The Trump administration’s ongoing attempts at manipulating US government economic data echoes controversies that have existed in the realm of development data for decades. These controversies highlight the unavoidable, intrinsically political nature of measuring social phenomena with economic statistics, and the role of economists in legitimizing (or not) such measures.

In early August, the employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) showed weaker than expected job growth for July and announced downward revisions (fewer new jobs than previously reported) for the two months prior. Trump responded by calling the accuracy of the report into question, and firing the head of the BLS, a career civil servant. This move provoked a round of criticism from other civil servants, economists, and experts on democracy, which only intensified when Trump initially nominated as the replacement E.J. Antoni, the chief economist for the right-wing think tank The Heritage Foundation. Antoni had been an outspoken critic of the BLS reports, even suggesting the possibility of ceasing to release monthly jobs data altogether, and was widely perceived by critics as both highly partisan and underqualified for the position. There is widespread concern that the jobs report will become less reliable, even leading to the current staff at the BLS publicly pleading with the public to still trust their numbers, for now. The BLS is also responsible for producing the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the central measure of inflation produced by the US government. Inflation’s centrality in recent politics, including promises from Trump to bring down prices on “day one,” have led to concerns that this measure could also be affected by political manipulation. There would be important real-world and policy impacts of a degraded CPI measure,  which affects tax brackets, the value of some treasury bonds, and social security and other social insurance payments.

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Lula da Silva and Brazilian financialization: Learning from Dilma and the Limits of Confronting Finance

The year 2025 will be the third consecutive year in which the Brazilian economy experiences sustained growth. During the first two years of his administration, economic expansion was above 3% annually, while the outlook for 2025 is for a slowdown: 2.4%, according to IPEA, one of Brazil’s leading state economic analysis agencies.

Since June-July 2024, during the U.S. presidential election and with the possibility of Trump being re-elected, Brazil, like other emerging economies, faced devaluation pressures. This led to higher inflation due to rising exchange rates and supply shocks caused by climate issues. These issues have reduced the food supply (mainly coffee, eggs, and beans), causing prices to rise.

This macroeconomic instability scenario was reloaded by the Trump-driven trade war, particularly when the 50% tariff on purchases from Brazil was announced under a mix of arguments between commercial (trade deficit), political (preventing Bolsonaro from being judged for an attempted coup d’état and US bigtech’s regulation), and geopolitical (the advance of the BRICS on a possible replacement of the dollar in commercial relationships).

What was the response in terms of economic policy? The institutionalization of the inflation target led to an increase in the SELIC interest rate from 10.75% in September 2024 to 15% in June 2025, the highest level since 2006. The orthodox argument suggests that raising interest rates reduces the money supply, curbing aggregate demand and reducing inflation. From another perspective, raising interest rates promotes carry trade, which attracts foreign capital through the capital account and allows the exchange rate to appreciate. In this way, the economy partially protects itself from speculative capital outflows and reduces the prices of imports and exports, thus decreasing the inflation.

In contrast, a sharp rise in interest rates deepens the pernicious effects of financialization: it impoverishes indebted families and concentrates income. Are there any other alternatives available? The economic toolbox offers other options. Many observers have noted a striking characteristic of Lula’s third administration: the absence of open confrontation with Brazil’s powerful financial sector. This is no coincidence. The painful lessons of Dilma Rousseff’s presidency (2011-2016) and her impeachment weigh heavily on current political calculations.

To understand this, we need to analyze the historical lesson of Rousseff’s removal, its macroeconomic causes, and how this experience has limited economic policy options.

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The Fiscal Black Holes of Mainstream Economics

By Jacob Assa and Marc Morgan

“The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being deceived by economists.”
― Joan Robinson

Recent years have seen a proliferation of debates on the shrinking of fiscal space in both industrialized and developing countries. In the former, the discussion often takes the form of agonizing over fiscal ‘black holes’, whereas in the latter it is usually presented in the context of ‘unaffordable debt’.

In reality, the real black holes, or blind spots, are those found in neoclassical economic models underlying such debates, rather than in the real economy (Table 1). We describe three such neoclassical fiscal black holes, based on our recent paper ‘The General Relativity of Fiscal Space’.

Table 1. Overview of fiscal black holes in the neoclassical paradigm.

Source: Authors’ elaboration. Shaded in black are the black holes of the neoclassical fiscal paradigm.

We show how fiscal space is not the absolute sum of taxes and borrowing, but rather relative in several ways. It depends on macroeconomic conditions, such as unemployment and inflation, countries’ degree of monetary sovereignty, and their level of productive capacity. Furthermore, fiscal space is relative to what governments do with it, expanding or contracting depending on the function of public spending.

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