The surge of right-wing populism in East-Central Europe is often portrayed as an unforeseen shift from the earlier post-1989 liberalization path. The “illiberal transformation” narrative underlines stark differences between the policy arsenals that informed democratization and marketization reforms in the early 1990s and those fueling current “democratic backsliding.” Yet this framing conceals the analytical maneuver of disconnecting the political sphere from its socioeconomic counterpart, thereby limiting democracy to the former and defining democratic participation based on electoral competition.

It was precisely this separation, which at the dawn of post-communist transformation, tended to align democratization not with leveling erstwhile power and wealth disparities, but with eradicating rent-seeking by the lingering elements of Soviet bureaucracy. Conceived in this way, democratization was deemed to be an engine of market reforms. Insofar as much of the “transitology” scholarship operated with a parochial “democracy” versus “authoritarianism” dichotomy, it repeatedly obscured authoritarian tendencies in consolidating democratic systems.

In the recently published article Democratic Facades, Authoritarian Penchants: Post-Communist Monetary Restructuring in the Baltic States, I argue that the corpus on “authoritarian neoliberalism” is well-positioned to instigate a much-needed departure from this externalization of “political” and “socioeconomic” spheres when revisiting the intricacies of post-communist transformation in general and monetary reforms in the Baltic states in particular.

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