Combining dependency theory and the regulation school: Understanding economic rents in Burkina Faso

Dependency theory is experiencing some kind of comeback and has been discussed at length on the Developing Economics blog. However, one criticism that often comes up when researchers work on the phenomenon of dependency is the fact that the separation between the spheres of periphery and centre may be too simple, insofar as the working class is also exploited in the countries of the centre, and the elite also benefits from such a system in the periphery. While some strands of dependency theory may provide important angles for analysis of trade between the Global North and South, such analysis also risks pitting development in the center against underdevelopment in the periphery. It is worth noting, however, that many dependency theorists did not think of the world in such binary terms, but rather centered class analysis in their frameworks.

In our recent work, we approach the problem of dependence slightly differently in an attempt to nuance our analysis. Dependence is linked to the country’s international insertion, marked by both political and economic relations of domination with the industrialized countries of the “center”, and is reflected in unequal economic specialisations and unfavourable terms of trade. However, ‘dependent’ countries have followed varied trajectories, which need to be analysed in their context, as dependency is not black and white. Let’s zoom in on West Africa. There, dependency is mainly based on rentier-type economic regimes. A rent is defined as obtaining income without contributing to the production of additional goods and services. In a paper dedicated to the situation in Burkina Faso, we have sought to understand a very specific historical case, representing an important rentier economy that was also well integrated into the global economy. We have sought to combine dependency and regulation theories to understand the stability of such a rentier economy. Let’s explore the economic history of Burkina Faso.

Following decolonization, a post-colonial model was put in place, based on an export economy mainly steered by the cotton industry. The newly-independent state replaced the French administration, enabling the elite to exploit raw material rents. Who were the main characters? Inherited from colonization, the system created a division between a class of urban wage earners – with legal rights – and the great mass of rural workers (80% of the population), for whom customary rules applied. The Mossi nobility, which controls cotton production in the center and east of the country, has inherited an important role and contributed to the formation of the Burkinabe state. However, in the West of the country, the majority of cotton growers come from various acephalous or segmented societies, escaping the influence of traditional chiefs. The Catholic Church is also an important actor. It retains its coveted position as a training institution for the elite, a position it already held during colonization. The state organized the economy in such a way as to guarantee the rent, thereby curbing all other attempts at accumulating capital. Through this strategy, competition was organized into a monopolistic regime.

The organization of production and foreign trade forced the country to import equipment, food and petroleum products. The economy remained marked by a structural trade deficit characteristic of dependency. In the 1960s, the model went into crisis due to climatic and economic factors, becoming even more pronounced in the 1970s. Monetary and economic policies varied, correlating with the frequent changes in government leadership that marked this early period, indicating an unbalanced rentier regime, with a compromise that is not stabilized yet between the different actors (owners as receivers) of the rent.

The revolution of the Sankara regime marked an important transition, with a reconfiguration of rent redistribution and an upheaval of institutionalized compromises, illustrating the gradual instability of the regulatory system since independence. In 1983, Upper Volta became Burkina Faso. Sankara re-established budget contraction and introduced a policy of self-adjustment, coupled with protectionism important public investment, especially dedicated to rural development. The Sankara period marked an evolution in several areas. Trade unions and traditional chiefs, deemed responsible for the backwardness of rural areas, were sidelined or even repressed, in favour of the peasantry, whom the new regime sought to turn into a revolutionary class. However, tensions built up in the highest spheres of power, undermining the already uneasy legitimacy of formal institutions. The unions gradually began to unite again. International pressure supported the discontent of the former political coalitions left behind by the Sankarist regime.

In 1987, following Sankara’s assassination, power passed to Compaoré, who prepared to overhaul the state and the economy. The new economic policy formulated in 1991 emphasized liberalization. With this new policy, Burkina Faso embarked on an active policy of international gains. This led to the development of export resources, due to the significant growth of Foreign Direct Investments through a deliberate strategy on the part of the government, which is also focusing on new forms of income – those generated by democratic openness and compliance with international standards of good governance. The State is developing marketing techniques to maximize its rents. Decentralization was also introduced in the 1990s, in line with international recommendations. For Burkina Faso’s government, it provided additional space for the accumulation of resources, through the flow of foreign aid to local projects. Thus, the new growth regime does not represent a profound structural break, but rather an exacerbation of rentier tendencies, with a diversification of resource sources. It is actually indicating an accentuation of dependency, in return for international gains and new sources of income for the ones involved in rent gains. The clientelist mode of resolving redistributive conflicts stabilized the regime when Compaoré remained in power from 1989 to 2014, implying a continual increase in the number of rent recipients to make it work. Compaoré thus re-established coalitions in power before Sankara, in a new configuration. For this, the cotton sector was not fully liberalized, contrary to the recommendations of the World Bank. On the external front though, there is a close link between the government and its technical and financial partners. The Compaoré regime’s status as a good pupil in the implementation of the international financial institutions’ recommendations and conditionalities has enabled it to maximize its rents.

What do we want to show through this story? Despite the country’s dependence on international trade (since decolonization, it has been confined to the production and export of low-value-added primary resources) and monetary structure (since the CFA franc is still running), the particular form of the Burkinabe state, combining the constraints of good governance and clientelist practices, helps to perpetuate this form of dependence, which benefits a small part of the population, to the detriment of all its citizens. The regime changes over time but is maintained. Although it is integrated into international trade and suffers its effects, Burkina Faso cannot be qualified as a passive periphery. Through its political elites, this country has pursued active strategies to obtain international resources, which have repercussions on the forms of production and employment. This raises the question of the diversity of models for dependent economies. The trajectories of these economies are varied, so that even a dominated regime deploys its own internal specificities, which make it possible to distinguish its model of regulation from other countries subject to the same constraints. In this context, a more in-depth analysis of dependence using a regulation approach proves pertinent, as the latter attempts to grasp the overall coherence of external (at the international level) and internal (at the national level) institutional forms.

Juliette Alenda is an Assistant Professor in the chair of economic theory and policy at Radboud University. She works on (environmental) sustainability and transformative governance in sub-Saharan Africa and co-coordinates the research group Transformative sustainable change in Action. 

Pierre Robert is a lecturer at the University of Lille, interested in questions of sustainable development in West Africa.

Photo by Kimberly Vardeman.

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